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Restatement: /r’I st’e•tm•nt: An iteration that repeats a prior
1
statement, usually in a slightly different form. Synonym: reiteration
The American Law Institute (ALI), in existence since 1923, has
a distinguished reputation for its law reform projects, typically
2
“restatements” of areas of domestic common law. The most
†
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continuing professional support. Thanks also to Mike Green and Wayne Logan
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1. ROGET’S II THE NEW THESAURUS 832–33 (Kaethe Ellis et al. eds., 3d ed.
1995).
2. In recent years, the ALI has branched out to projects concerned with
international law (e.g., Transnational Insolvency) and domestic topics typically
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successful of these projects involves the law of torts. There were
more than 160,000 judicial citations to restatements by 2004, with
the largest single number, by a considerable margin, involving
3
torts. Additionally, positions promulgated by the ALI, though not
4
binding on any court, often loom large in doctrinal debates.
This essay will first discuss the ALI and the role it has played in
law reform, especially when it navigates the tension between simply
adopting a well-developed majority position and the desire to “get
it right” (by selecting a distinctly minority position). I will then
turn to one of the rare occasions in which the ALI in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional
Harm (2010) (Third Restatement) opted for a position that is not
even a minority rule, but rather is a novel formulation—the
“flagrant trespasser” in premises liability cases—that is, when the
restatement does not “restate” the law. I will conclude with some
reflections on the wisdom of such a bold step.
I.

THE ALI AND LAW REFORM

A. When Giants Walked the Earth: The ALI and the First and Second
Restatements of Torts
In the early decades of the twentieth century, a project to
“restate the law” was attractive to both the formalists then reigning
in the bench and bar, as well as the legal realists, who were gaining
5
influence, especially in law schools.
To the old guard,
controlled by statutes (e.g., Professional Responsibility). Projects, Overview,
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.main
(last visited Apr. 9, 2011).
3. During this time there were more than 67,000 citations to the torts
restatements, with the contracts restatements a distant second with slightly less than
29,000 citations.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PUBLISHED CASE CITATIONS TO
RESTATEMENTS OF THE LAW AS OF MARCH 1, 2004 (2004), available at http://www.ali.org
/_news/annualreports/2004/AM04_07-RestatementCitations04.pdf.
4. See Gregory C. Keating, Is Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress a
Freestanding Tort?, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1134–35 (2009) (recognizing the
“Restatement impulse to elicit taxonomical order” but arguing that the
Restatement does not accurately reflect the order immanent in the law);
Christopher J. Robinette, The Prosser Notebook: Classroom as Biography and Intellectual
History, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 577, 579 (2010) (describing the broad influence of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)).
5. See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 77–78 (1977); see also
John P. Frank, The American Law Institute, 1923–1998, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 615, 617
(1998) (noting that the thirty-five member committee, including Benjamin
Cardozo, Learned Hand, and Roscoe Pound, reported that uncertainty and
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traditionalists who considered the common law “a closed system
6
that yielded answers to all issues that arise,” this presented an
opportunity to bolster their view of law as science and to lock in
contemporary principles and practices, an aspect of a broader
effort to rebuff the mongrelization of the profession via the
proliferation of night law schools that primarily served immigrant
7
strivers.
The President of the Association of American Law
Schools (AALS) was blunt: “As long as our doors were entered
chiefly by immigrants of cognate blood, the common law as it was
studied by Story and Langdell might safely be left to develop and
adapt itself to each changed condition. But within the last twenty
years a horde of alien races from Eastern Europe and from Asia has
8
been pouring in on us . . . .”
Xenophobia and a deep-seated fear of change were not,
however, the only motivations of the traditionalists. Formalists also,
more palatably, saw a need for “definite standards by which the
9
activities of business, industry and commerce are conducted.”
The countervailing jurisprudence of legal realism can be
traced, in part, to the provocative ideas of Roscoe Pound who, as
dean at the University of Nebraska College of Law, and later a
faculty member and dean at Harvard Law School, focused on the
10
imprecise nature of the law. Pound argued for legal principles
complexity caused by badly written statutes and unnecessary administrative
provisions required a “Restatement of the Law”).
6. Frank, supra note 5, at 624 (quoting ALI Director Herbert Wechsler).
7. The “conventional wisdom [was] that the ALI was created by a band of
legal formalists working hand in hand with the legal moguls of New York and
Philadelphia corporate finance to save the common law from statutory
liberalization and other un-American pollutants.” N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and
Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law Institute, in THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE: SEVENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY, 1923–1998, 49, 52 (1998); see also G.
Edward White, The American Law Institute and the Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence,
15 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 3 (1997) (describing the “conservatives,” who swore fealty
to nineteenth-century conceptions of law was a branch of science, “logically selfcontained and self-referential, like geometry, or taxonomic, like the natural
sciences”).
8. Hull, supra note 7, at 60–61. Another AALS leader observed:
[I]f you examine the class rolls of the night schools in our great cities,
you will encounter a very large proportion of foreign names. . . . The
result is a host of shrewd young men, imperfectly educated, crammed so
they can pass bar examinations . . . but viewing the Code of Ethics with
uncomprehending eyes.
Id. at 61.
9. Frank, supra note 5, at 621 (quoting ALI President George W.
Wickersham).
10. See Larry A. DiMatteo & Samuel Flaks, Beyond Rules, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 297,
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based on the world as it was, rather than law plucked from the
11
ether. These critics accepted, and in some cases embraced, the
notion that legal rules were inherently impermanent, and that
there needed to be adjustments based upon “evolving empirical
12
data.”
Despite the tug of the two schools of jurisprudence, on
balance, the founders of the ALI were primarily “reformist
progressive-pragmatists who viewed the law as the means to
achieving social ends, believers in the power of the legal profession
13
to bring about positive change.”
Many legal luminaries gathered in 1923 to consider creating
what was to become the American Law Institute. In attendance
were three justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, five
federal court of appeals judges, twenty-eight representatives from
state supreme courts, representatives from the American Bar
Association and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform Laws, plus stars from legal education, including twenty14
three law school deans. They met to consider the report of a committee of thirty-five, which included Associate Justice Harlan F.
Stone, Judges Benjamin Cardozo and Learned Hand, top appellate
advocate John W. Davis, Dean Roscoe Pound, and Professor John
15
Wigmore.
326 (2010) (exploring the two lines of legal thought comprising the legal realist
movement).
11. See Hull, supra note 7, at 53.
12. White, supra note 7, at 3. White argues that the view that the ALI pitted
two different schools of jurisprudence is overstated and that the progressives
differed from conservatives in points of emphasis, but not with the basic idea that
“restating the law” would yield more predictable judicial decisions. Id. at 9–10. It
remained for the proponents of critical legal studies to take the perspective that
law is personal and indeterminate to its logical conclusion. See Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, Factless Jurisprudence, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 615, 617 n.9 (2003)
(citing John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal
Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45 DUKE L.J. 84, 89
(1995)).
13. Hull, supra note 7, at 86. But see GILMORE, supra note 5, at 73 (“No doubt
most of the people who were caught up in the Restatement project shared the
Institute’s official position” that there were fundamental principles of the
common law, which did not change.).
14. The New York Times described the meeting as “probably the most
distinguished gathering of the legal profession in the history of this country.”
Hull, supra note 7, at 89.
15. See JOHN P. FRANK, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: SEVENTY-FIFTH
ANNIVERSARY, 1923–98, 9 (1998). Support for the ALI was not, however, uniform—
Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. quoted Justice Louis Brandeis as
quipping, “Why, I am restating the law every day.” THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss3/11

4

Logan: When the Restatement Is Not a Restatement: The Curious Case of th

1452

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:3

The report concluded that there was a pressing need for an
institute that would create a “Restatement of the Law” to deal with
16
the deplorable state of the common law.
First, there was the
“great volume of the annual increase to the already overwhelming
mass of reported cases,” which “cannot be directly checked by any
17
action which may be taken by the profession.”
This, in turn,
resulted in a “‘lack of agreement among [the members of the legal
profession on] the fundamental principles of the common law’ and
18
the ‘lack of precision in the use of legal terms.’” “The committee
concluded that these ‘two causes of uncertainty and complexity are
precisely those over which the legal profession has the greatest
19
control.’” The report concluded:
We speak of the work which the organization should
undertake as a restatement; its object should not only be
to help make certain much that is now uncertain and to
simplify unnecessary complexities, but also to promote
those changes which will tend better to adapt the laws to
the needs of life. The character of the restatement which
we have in mind can be best described by saying that it
20
should be at once analytical, critical and constructive.
Despite these grounds for agreement, the participants
recognized from the outset the inherent tension at the core of their
mission: should the goal be to simply count citations (“the law as it
is”) or to articulate what the law should be. As the report observed,
“the law is not always well adapted to promote what the
preponderating thought of the community regards as the needs of
21
life.” However, the changes should be restricted to those that are
22
“generally accepted as desirable.”
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 50TH ANNIVERSARY 276 (2d ed. 1973) (quoting a
letter written by Justice Holmes).
16. Frank, supra note 5, at 617 (quoting the ALI’s first committee report in
1923); see infra note 20, at 173–223.
17. Frank, supra note 5, at 617 (quoting the ALI’s first committee report in
1923); see infra note 20, at 187.
18. Frank, supra note 5, at 617 (quoting the ALI’s first committee report in
1923); see infra note 20, at 186.
19. Frank, supra note 5, at 617 (quoting the ALI’s first committee report in
1923); see infra note 20, at 188.
20. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT
ORGANIZATION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE LAW PROPOSING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
AN AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE SEVENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY 1923–1998, 190 (1998).
21. Id. at 192.
22. Id.; Frank, supra note 5, at 618 (quoting the institute’s report).
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The group approved the establishment of the ALI and, after
securing funding from the Carnegie Foundation, set about to study
core topics that became the first restatements in contracts, agency,
23
conflicts, and torts.
These reports, in the distinctive black
letter/comment format, were drafted in the first instance by a
“reporter,” who recruited a group of experts to serve as “advisers,”
who helped the reporter prepare a subject-specific document that
would be considered by a “council,” and finally approved by the full
24
membership of the ALI
The ALI was organized in a way that enhanced its influence in
the coming decades. By giving the critical role of reporter to
academic lawyers, the ALI made it likely that its proposals would be
well-grounded in the current law and mindful of doctrinal critiques
and suggestions for reform. The flip-side risk of turning out
proposals that were excessively academic was checked by the
presence in the membership, and on the council, of significant
numbers of practicing lawyers and judges. Quality control also was
enhanced by the requirement that all voters—whether in the rankand-file membership, the drafting committee of the advisers, or the
council—were to be elected on a meritocratic basis. Finally, the
requirement that any final draft had to be approved by both the
council and the entire membership minimized the risk that the
final product would be dominated by an idiosyncratic interest
25
group.

23. Frank, supra note 5, at 619.
24. For a thorough survey of the restatement process, see Kristen David
Adams, Blaming the Mirror: The Restatements and the Common Law, 40 IND. L. REV. 205
(2007).
25. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, 303–
04 (1999); see also id. at 309 (“The Institute’s unusual balance of practical lawyerly
judgment, legislative-type consensus-generating machinery, and scholarly expertise
equips it to provide leadership in [law reform].”); Herbert Wechsler, Foreward, THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 50TH ANNIVERSARY, vii–viii (2d ed. 1973) (noting that one
of the greatest strengths of the ALI is the “triple challenge” of consecutive review
of the reporter’s draft by the project’s advisers, the council, and the membership
of the ALI). There is also a less flattering motive for the ALI’s organization: status.
White, supra note 7, at 3 (“The composition of the Institute, the selection process
for its members, the self-conscious links forged in that process between elite law
faculties, elite practitioners, and judges . . . were efforts to clarify and reinforce
status criteria and status distinctions within the legal profession.”).
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B. The First and Second Torts Restatements
The reporter for the Restatement (First) of Torts (1934) (First
Restatement) was Francis Bohlen from the University of
Pennsylvania, “the outstanding and nationally known expert in
26
[the] field.”
He recruited an all-star team of advisers that
included leading federal judges (Learned Hand), state judges
(Connecticut Chief Justice George Wheeler), and top academics
from Yale Law School (Leon Green and Edward Thurston) and
University of Chicago Law School (Dean James Hall), with perhaps
the greatest common law judge, New York’s Benjamin Cardozo,
27
attending a number of meetings in an unofficial capacity.
From the outset, all members of the ALI agreed that the
28
common law needed to be “tidied up,” but there was
disagreement as to whether the restatements should be descriptive
or prescriptive. As a long-time member of the ALI Council, Shirley
Abrahamson, chief justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
observed: There is always the struggle between the law “that is” and
29
the law as it “ought to be.”

26. William Draper Lewis, Francis Hermann Bohlen, 91 U. PA. L. REV. & AM. L.
REG. 377, 381 (1943).
27. An academic kerfuffle arose when the leading torts scholar of the midcentury era, William L. Prosser, attacked Cardozo’s behavior in conjunction with
the first restatement. Prosser alleged that Cardozo attended a meeting of the
advisers (he was not technically an adviser, but his standing as a top thinker about
torts issues explained his presence) while knowing that he would soon be
considering the appeal of a case involving a bizarre chain of events that led to a
woman’s injury while she stood on the defendant’s railroad platform. William L.
Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1953). Prosser asserted that Cardozo
attended the meeting but did not participate in the discussion or vote on the
“hypothetical”. Id. at 4. In Prosser’s account, Cardozo returned to Albany and
soon ruled in the railroad’s favor by adopting the majority view of the advisers. Id.
at 5. The ALI adopted the view expressed by Cardozo in Palsgraf, and even used
the facts of Palsgraf for one of its illustrations. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §
281 cmt. g, illus. 3 (1934). To Prosser, “[i]t is not likely that any other case in all
history ever elevated itself by its own bootstraps in so remarkable a manner.”
Prosser, supra note 27, at 8. More recent scholarship acknowledges that Cardozo
heard ALI discussions about the border between duty and proximate cause raised
by Palsgraf but disputes whether Cardozo actually attended a meeting that
discussed the facts of Palsgraf before he heard the appeal. ANDREW L. KAUFMAN,
CARDOZO, 286–95 (1998).
28. Posner, supra note 25, at 304 (arguing that the ALI is less well-adapted
today than it was in the 1920s because doctrinal law has been tidied up by now).
29. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin and the
American Law Institute the Fairchild Lecture, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1, 17 (1995).
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By general consensus, the first restatements, which consisted of
30
nineteen volumes, broke little new ground, pursuing what one
scholar termed the “mild reform” strategy suggested in the ALI’s
founding document: when the laws in the states differ in ways “not
due to differences in economic and social conditions . . . the
restatement should make clear what is believed to be the proper
31
rule of law.”
Work on a second series of restatements began at the end of
World War II, and the tension between restating and reforming the
32
law was raised explicitly by Judge Learned Hand. A committee he
headed concluded that the organization should identify which
provisions were “‘founded on historical facts,’ which were
‘unjustified by any principles of justice, but are unimportant or
harmless and may be left as they are because of the desirably of
certainty,’ and ‘what rules are insupportable in principle and evil in
33
action.’” Henry Hart and Albert Sacks criticized the preference
for conservatism: “[T]he Institute limited itself to the role only of a
follower in the statement of the law and of a follower, moreover,
34
willing to join the parade only after it was well under way.” This
preference for de juris condendum—the law as it should be—would
prove to be an even stronger force for the Restatement (Second) of
35
Torts (1965) (Second Restatement).
30. Herbert Wechsler, Restatements and Legal Change: Problems of Policy in the
Restatement Work of the American Law Institute, 13 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 185, 185–86
(1968) (on the topics of contracts, agency, conflict of laws, trusts, restitution, torts,
security, judgments, and property).
31. Patrick J. Kelley, The First Restatement of Torts: Reform by Descriptive Theory, 32
S. ILL. U. L.J. 93, 106 (2007). Kelley believes that the only significant reform came
via the adoption of reporter Bohlen’s innovative positions on liability for children
and the insane. Id. at 107; see also Frank, supra note 5, at 624 (the only case where
the ALI adopted a distinctly minority principle was section 90 of the contracts
restatement, which involved promissory estoppel); Benjamin Kaplan, Encounters
with O.W. Holmes, Jr., 96 HARV. L. REV. 1828, 1835 (1983) (the first restatements of
contracts and torts were “relatively conservative works”); Warren A. Seavey, The
Restatement, Second, and Stare Decisis, 48 A.B.A. J. 317, 318 (1962) (“[T]he
statements were usually in agreement with the rules in a very large percentage of
the states, a survey showing something like ninety per cent [sic] agreement with
decided cases on contested points . . . .”).
32. See generally Frank, supra note 5, at 622–23 (“[C]onclud[ing] that the first
Restatement had been overly static”).
33. Frank, supra note 5, at 623.
34. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW 740 (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
35. A willingness to adopt minority positions, and thus become more
prescriptive, was consistent with the gradual change in outlook of the ALI
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The ALI once again assembled a supremely talented team for
the Second Restatement project: Berkeley Dean William Prosser—
whose treatise had already become a fixture for practitioners and
36
academics —was named reporter, and he was assisted by a roster of
advisers that included academic luminaries John Wade (Vanderbilt
University Law School), Fleming James, Jr. (Yale Law School),
Warren Seavey and Robert Keeton (Harvard Law School), Page
Keeton (University of Texas School of Law), Clarence Morris
(University of Pennsylvania School of Law), and Roger Traynor,
37
chief justice of the California Supreme Court. The introduction
to the publications acknowledged “there has been enormous
change in torts” since the First Restatement; indeed, “the scope of
change wrought by the courts may . . . have transcended that in any
38
other field.”
The project was massive: it involved twenty-two
preliminary drafts, forty-one council drafts, and twenty-three
39
tentative drafts produced over a period of twenty-two years.
The most significant, and controversial, change wrought by
Dean Prosser et al. was a new section covering injuries caused by
40
defective products.
Courts had been gradually extending the
scope of contract (warranty) law (which required no proof of fault)
to an array of consumer injuries from food products, and, in a few
scattered cases, to injuries caused by products “intended for bodily
use” (such as cosmetics). However, there was only scholarly
authority for a global theory of strict liability for products injuries
directors over the years. See Abrahamson, supra note 29 at 19–21.
36. Christopher J. Robinette, The Prosser Notebook: Classroom as Biography and
Intellectual History, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 577, 579 (2010).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, iii–iv (1965). Justice Traynor was
perhaps the best-known state court judge of his era. Stewart Macaulay, Justice
Traynor and the Law of Contracts, 13 STAN. L. REV. 812, 812 (1961) (“In his twenty
years on the Supreme Court of California Justice Roger J. Traynor has become one
of the country’s best known state judges.”).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Introduction, at ix (1965).
39. Michael Greenwald, American Law Institute, 79 LAW LIBR. J. 297, 302
(1987).
40. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 265 (2d ed. 2008). The Second
Restatement also made significant changes to the narrow pocket of cases that were
deemed appropriate for strict liability, i.e., those activities deemed
“ultrahazardous.” This section was satisfied when the activity was both especially
dangerous and not a “matter of common usage.”
Further, the Second
Restatement changed terminology to “abnormally dangerous activities,” and
adopted a multi-factor approach, of which common usage was only a factor (as is
whether the locale was appropriate for the activity). This approach was harshly
criticized, inter alia, as a “poorly disguised negligence regime.” DAN B. DOBBS, THE
LAW OF TORTS 953 (2000).
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41

generally until the California Supreme Court handed down
42
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., in 1963. Building on this
single decision, the Second Restatement announced a new doctrine
43
of strict products liability in tort.
At the same time, Dean Prosser was reworking the sections
from the First Restatement that covered injuries from products. In
rapid succession he proposed drafts that moved from a beachhead
of strict liability in tort for injuries caused by food (1958),
expanding to “products intended for intimate bodily use, including
44
products intended for external application or contact” (1962)
45
and, finally, to all products (1964). Despite sharp criticism of the
46
new provision, the resulting section 402A was adopted by the ALI
47
in 1964.
Section 402A was built on scant doctrinal foundation, as Dean
Prosser could point to virtually no case authority and relatively little
scholarship to tease out the application of the core concept of strict
liability in tort to the variety of contexts in which products could
harm consumers, let alone bystanders. In essence, the ALI, quite
uncharacteristically, boldly painted on what amounted to a blank
canvas. As one early critic put it, the ALI was guilty of “ignoring the
traditional role of the Institute: to restate only rules of law
48
embraced by a majority of the courts.” Many courts fell in line
41. See, e.g., William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
42. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). There were cases that imposed strict liability via
application of the implied warranty of merchantability, but such cases, as a
technical matter, were not considered to reflect tort law and, more significantly,
provided defendants with an array of defenses (like the ability to disclaim a
warranty or requiring notice before filing suit) that were anti-consumer and not
applicable to claims sounding in tort. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument
Corp., 191 N.E.2d 81, 83 (N.Y. 1963) (applauding Greenman for recognizing “‘strict
tort liability’ (surely a more accurate phrase)” rather than breach of warranty).
43. OWEN, supra note 40, at 257.
44. OWEN, supra note 40, at 265 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1961)).
45. OWEN, supra note 40, at 265.
46. The Defense Research Institute widely circulated a brief arguing that the
ALI should return to its traditional policy of “restating established law as it is.”
Fred B. Helms, The Restatements: Existing Law or Prophecy, 56 A.B.A. J. 152, 154
(1970); see also Jay M. Smyser, Products Liability and the American Law Institute: A
Petition for Rehearing, 42 U. DETROIT L.J. 343 (1965) (arguing section 402A was
unjustified in either decisional law or sound public policy).
47. OWEN, supra note 40, at 281; see Wechsler, supra note 31, at 187–92
(detailing the deliberations by the ALI Council that led to the approval of section
402A).
48. Herbert W. Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform
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49

soon thereafter, besting Dean Prosser’s prediction that it would
take at least five decades for the new principle to become
50
dominant. The remarkable speed with which section 402A was
adopted by courts presented its own problems. While consistent
with the explosion of progressive reforms across common law,
51
legislative, and constitutional law, the result was that judges who
considered product liability claims could not evaluate the wisdom
of 402A against the backdrop of the careful accretion of precedent
52
characteristic of the common law.
Over time, courts and scholars came to recognize that there
was a range of possible product claims, and they increasingly
questioned whether a strict liability regime made sense in all
53
contexts. This critique was especially powerful when challenging
Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713, 715 (1970). Professor Titus also expressed
dismay that a major change in the law came via the restatement, rather than
through legislative changes to state versions of the Uniform Commercial Code. Id.
at 755 (“If legislative supremacy means anything, it must mean that the courts
cannot create a new rule of strict tort liability that will displace the productsliability scheme of the Uniform Commercial Code.”).
49. OWEN, supra note 40, at 255 (“[S]trict manufacturer liability for defective
products swept into the American law of torts during the 1960s”) (citations
omitted).
50. Prosser, supra note 41, at 1120 (“[Strict liability] may very possibly be the
law of fifty years ahead.”).
51. See ROBERT KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE 3 (1969) (describing the
outpouring of torts opinions across the nation between 1958 and 1968 as one of
“candid, openly acknowledged, abrupt change”); see also Civil Rights Act of 1964 §
201(a), 42 U.S.C. 2000a (2006) (“All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of any place of public accommodation . . . without
discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national
origin.”); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258–59
(1964) (holding that sections 201–07 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000a–2000a-6 (1964) were constitutional and that a public hotel “has no ‘right’ to
select its guests as it sees fit, free from governmental regulation”); Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding state sponsored segregation unconstitutional
and overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
52. Titus, supra note 48, at 716 (“Even so, one might have hoped for some
judicial restraint so that issues posed by the strict tort rule might have been refined
and shaped by the facts in actual cases. . . .”); see also Suzanna Sherry, Politics and
Judgment, 70 MO. L. REV. 973, 982 (2005) (“In both common law and constitutional
adjudication, incrementalism and adherence to precedent work hand-in-hand to
ensure that the law will change slowly, through accretion and subtle revision
rather than through sudden or fundamental shifts in policy.”); Clyde W. Summers,
American Labor Law Scholarship-Some Comments, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 801, 801
(2002) (“The law is built on countless court decisions; if it grows at all, it is not so
much by design, but by accretion.”).
53. See, e.g., William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products
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the design of a product, which often involved complex, polycentric
choices made by technically trained experts, a task for which 402A’s
54
“ordinary consumer expectation” test seemed ill-suited.
Interestingly, and reflecting the gravitational pull of the
restatement and the earliest post-Second Restatement judicial
55
decisions, courts would often hew to the rhetoric of strict liability,
while actually applying a negligence-like analysis in design defect
56
cases. Similarly, many courts and commentators came to reject
true strict liability for products claimed to have informational
57
flaws. That is, where a plaintiff claimed that the injury occurred
58
The notable
because of insufficient warnings or instructions.
failure at bold law reform that section 402A represented was a key
aspect of the intellectual environment that faced the ALI as it
prepared for a third torts restatement.
C. The Third Restatement
As the ALI leadership considered a third restatement of (the
first topic to be treated with a third project), they addressed two
important changes: one doctrinal and the other logistical. First,
there were areas of tort law that had undergone especially rapid
59
change since the Second Restatement.
As mentioned above,
there had been significant judicial, scholarly, and legislative
Liability, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 639, 639 (1991) (“[P]roduct cases differ more among
themselves than they differ from other personal injury cases.”).
54. Id. at 652–55.
55. See, e.g., Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955 (Md. 1976); Thibault
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg.
Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033
(Or. 1974) (en banc); Turner v. Gen. Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
56. See OWEN, supra note 40, at 255 (“While the courts continued to claim
that they were applying liability that was ‘strict,’ it became increasingly clear that
the standards normally applied were truly based on fault.”).
57. See, e.g., Steven P. Coley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The
Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 716–17 (1993); Richard A.
Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Products Liability Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.
2193, 2204–06 (1980); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in
Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L.
REV. 1387, 1416–19 (1983); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A
Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 374–84 (1988).
58. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
59. See Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI
Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631 (1995) (discussing the evolution of
products liability law); Aaron D. Twerski, One Size Does Not Fit All: The Third MultiTrack Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 75 IND. L.J. 667 (2000) (discussing the
evolution of the concept of “apportionment”).
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movement away from strict liability for injuries caused by
60
products. There also had been many changes to what came to be
termed “apportionment,” caused by the rise of comparative fault
61
and the demise of joint and several liability. Second, the ALI
recognized that torts had become so complex that it was
unreasonable to assign the entire new torts restatement to a single
62
reporter, no matter how talented.
As a result, the Third
Restatement came to be made up of chunks (or “projects”), now
termed, Products Liability, Apportionment, Liability for Physical
and Emotional Harm, and Economic Harm, handled by different
63
sets of reporters.
The first, and most controversial, project concerned Products
Liability and the appointment of Professors James Henderson, Jr.
64
and Aaron Twerski as co-reporters. Henderson and Twerski were
marked men from the beginning, as their published scholarship
reflected considerable skepticism about the wisdom of strict liability
65
for many, if not most, products-related injuries. Henderson was
candid on this point, observing, “When I was first appointed [coreporter with Twerski] the Plaintiff’s Bar had, collectively, what
66
might pass for an aneurism,” and that “we plead guilty to the
charge that we did not restate existing case law. One could hardly
67
be expected to restate gibberish.”
The jurisprudential philosophy of the reporters was not the
only flashpoint. There was also concern about the none-too-subtle
efforts to hijack the process on the part of ALI members, who in
60. See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.
61. Twerski, supra note 59, at 671–72.
62. Stephen D. Sugarman, Rethinking Tort Doctrine: Visions of a Restatement
(Fourth) of Torts, 50 UCLA L. REV. 585, 587 (2002); see also Richard A. Posner,
Thursday Evening Session, 72 A.L.I. PROC. 321, 323 (1995) (describing how the pool
of candidates for reporter had moved from the “generally acknowledged leading
law schools” because of the “democratization of the law school world, which has
dramatically narrowed the quality differences among the different tiers of law
schools”).
63. See Ellen Pryor, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Coordination and Continuation,
44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1383, 1384 (2009) (describing the various projects,
including the one covering economic harm, which is now in its early stages).
64. Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Believing in Products Liability: Reflections on Daubert,
Doctrinal Evolution, and David Owen’s Products Liability Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
511, 517–18 (2006).
65. Id. at 518–19.
66. James A. Henderson, Jr., Revising Section 402A: The Limits of Tort as Social
Insurance, 10 TOURO L. REV. 107, 111 (1993).
67. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs Are
Different, 111 YALE L.J. 151, 180 (2001).
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their private practices regularly represented either plaintiffs or
68
defendants.
Born in controversy and at odds with the original rationales for
and concepts of strict liability, the core provisions of the products
69
liability project were perceived as anti-consumer. And, as critics
predicted, in the ensuing years, key new provisions have been
rejected by some courts because the rules go “beyond the law,” set
the bar for recovery too high, and amount to a “regression in the
70
law.”
Professor Frank Vandall was convinced that the Third
Restatement’s handling of products represented “radical
71
restructuring” of existing products liability theory, and that it
72
violated the ALI’s mission to “restate the law,” while Professor
Ellen Wertheimer took the ALI to task because the restatement
“does not in fact restate the law,” but rather, “changes the law,
invariably in ways unfavorable to plaintiffs and faithless to the

68. Alex Elson, The Case for an In-Depth Study of the American Law Institute, 23
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 625, 636 (1998) (describing ALI response to “a number of
gross incidents of special interest lobbying . . . in connection with the . . . product
liability [restatement]”). See, e.g., Kristen David Adams, The Folly of Uniformity?
Lessons from the Restatement Movement, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 423, 440–42 (2004); see
also Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin and the
American Law Institute, 1995 WISC. L. REV. 1, 31 (describing how corporate clients
were said to have pressured practitioners who were ALI members to oppose
progressive proposals in violation of the ALI’s “check your client at the door”
rules); Frank, supra note 5, at 628–31 (describing efforts of “pressure groups” to
influence ALI projects). See generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political
Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 597 (stating that public choice
theory explains why ALI projects may reflect the “preferences of legislators”).
69. Larry S. Stewart, Strict Liability for Defective Product Design: The Quest for a
Well-Ordered Regime,74 BROOK. L. REV. 1039, 1040 (2009).
70. Id.; see also David W. Lannetti, Toward a Revised Definition of “Product” Under
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 845, 851 n.30
(2000) (describing the conflicting views of leading scholars on the credibility of
the process and final product); John F. Vargo, The Emperor’s New Clothes: The
American Law Institute Adorns a “New Cloth” for Section 402A Products Liability Design
Defects—A Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493, 501–
02 (1996) (arguing that reporters’ claim that requirement that plaintiffs introduce
evidence of a “reasonable alternative design” reflected a consensus of authority
was inaccurate).
71. See Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section
2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1407, 1407,
1423–24 (1994).
72. Frank J. Vandall, Constructing a Roof Before the Foundation is Prepared: The
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b) Design Defect, 30 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 261, 279 (1997).
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73

original goals of section 402A.”
The second project was called “Apportionment,” and it tackled
an area in which there had been significant change over the
decades—virtually all states had replaced the mechanical (and
draconian) affirmative defense of contributory negligence with one
74
of several strains of comparative fault. Concurrently, there was
also the erosion of the automatic imposition of joint and several
75
liability among multiple tortfeasors. While debate was spirited in
the ALI and in scholarly journals, the Apportionment project was a
relatively congenial process compared to the war that had erupted
76
over the law of products liability.
The most wide-ranging of the Third Restatement efforts has
undergone changes in both nomenclature and scope; the current
title is “Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm,” but it is still
77
often referred to as the “General Principles Project.”
It has
generated significant controversy on several fronts, most notably
involving the adoption of a general rule of duty tied to risk78
creation. As one of the reporters, Michael Green, admitted, this
79
While most of the
provision has received “stinging criticism.”
intellectual combat on whether to impose a general duty of
reasonable care took place in scholarly journals, the causation
rules, which were perceived by some to tilt in favor of plaintiffs,
especially in complex areas like toxic torts, reprised some of the
ideological battle played out earlier in the ALI debates about
80
products liability. When the decision was made to extend the
73. Ellen Wertheimer, The Third Restatement of Torts: An Unreasonably Dangerous
Doctrine, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1235, 1255 (1994).
74. OWEN, supra note 40, at 852.
75. See generally John W. Wade, Should Joint and Several Liability of Multiple
Tortfeasors be Abolished?, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 193 (1986)(discussing the campaign
for “tort law reform” and its concentrated attack on the rule of joint and several
liability).
76. But see Frank J. Vandall, Constricting Products Liability: Reforms in Theory and
Procedure, 48 VILL. L. REV. 843, 859 (2003) (“The theme of the Restatement
(Third): Apportionment is that joint and several liability is flawed, and that any
approach is better than joint and several liability.”).
77. See W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV.
671, 679 (2008) (stating that “[t]he portion of the Third Restatement that
addresses tort duty generally was begun in the latter half of the 1990s, entitled at
the time ‘General Principles’”).
78. See generally Vandall, supra note 76; see also Cardi & Green, supra note 77,
at 680–81.
79. Cardi & Green, supra note 77, at 671.
80. The author, David A. Logan, is an ALI adviser for the Third Restatement.
In his capacity as adviser to the Third Restatement, Mr. Logan attended many
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General Principles Project to include premises liability, the stage
was set for an effort to, in at least one circumstance, not restate the
law, but remake it.
II. HOW WE GOT HERE: THE PREMISES MESS
It is a tale oft-told, so it will be only briefly summarized here.
The American law of premises liability was based upon the feudal
notion that a man’s worth, both reputational and financial, was tied
to the ownership of land, which meant that the safety of entrants
81
One American court
on that land was of scant importance.
described the roots of our common law:
Traced to its source, the rule exempting a landowner
from liability to a trespasser injured through the
condition of the premises is found to have originated in
an overzealous desire to safeguard the right of ownership
as it was regarded under a system of landed estates, long
since abandoned, under which the law ascribed a peculiar
sanctity to rights therein. Under the feudal system as it
existed in western Europe during the Middle Ages, the act
of breaking a man’s close was an invasion of exaggerated
82
importance and gravity. It was promptly resented.
Dean Prosser observed: “He has a privilege to make use of the
land for his own benefit, and according to his own desires, which is
83
an integral part of our whole system of private property.”
To implement this preference for safeguarding the rights of
landowners, the common law established a three-tiered regime that
tied the level of duty owed to an entrant to the reason he was on
84
85
the land. In its earliest form, a “full duty of reasonable care” was

meetings in which these provisions were debated.
81. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transaltantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630
(1959).
82. Humphrey v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 139 A. 440, 442 (Vt. 1927).
83. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 358 (3d ed. 1964).
84. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, TORTS
AND COMPENSATION, 317–30 (6th ed. 2009). This approach was consistent with the
general approach of courts to physical injuries, which tied what duties were owed
to the status/relationship of the injured and the injurer. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 40 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 2007).
85. A “full duty of reasonable care” includes both a duty to use reasonable
care to rectify known dangers and a duty to inspect for the same; other entrants
are owed a “limited” duty of reasonable care, with no duty to inspect. 5 FOWLER V.
HARPER ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 27.1, 142–46 (3d ed. 2008).
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owed only to entrants on the premises for a specific business
purpose, such as performing a contract for the owner, a person
86
termed “an invitee.”
Other entrants, even those with permission to enter (termed
“licensees”), were owed a minimal duty—merely to refrain from
intentionally injuring the entrant, or, in later years, refraining from
non-intentional, but nevertheless “willful” and “wanton”
87
negligence. And, if the common law gave little regard for the
safety of people on the premises with permission but with a nonbusiness purpose, then it is not surprising that for those on the
premises without permission (trespassers) property owners only
owed them the minimal duty to refrain from inflicting injury
88
through highly culpable misconduct.
By the mid-twentieth century, in both the United States and
Great Britain, courts had carved out exceptions to what had come
to be perceived as the unduly harsh results associated with
89
application of the three-tiered, or status, approach.
The first
route to reform was extending the full duty of reasonable care to
certain non-business entrants who were on the premises with
permission. For example, the courts recognized a new kind of
invitee, one who lacked a business purpose but was injured while
90
on land held open to the public generally. Such a “public invitee”
was owed a full duty of reasonable care even when window
shopping on private premises or while on public premises, such as
91
in a post office or public park.
The Second Restatement also recognized the need for change
to the rules applicable to some trespassers, propounding a cluster
of ameliorative exceptions to the harsh common law rules: for
86. Id.
87. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 60, 377–79 (4th
ed. 1971); see also Keith N. Hylton, Tort Duties of Landowners: A Positive Theory, 44
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1049, 1050 (2009) (explaining the “incentive-based function
of the classical landowner duties”).
88. PROSSER, supra note 83, at 365 (“When they enter where they have no
right or privilege, the responsibility is theirs, and they must assume the risk of what
they may encounter, and are expected to look out for themselves.”). There is also
an instrumental/economic argument for the minimal duty owed a trespasser. See
Keith N. Hylton, Tort Duties of Landowners: A Positive Theory, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1049, 1066 (2009) (stating that a rule of limited duty to trespassers is justified
because the trespasser is often the “cheapest-cost-avoider,” and the law should
protect the “subjective valuations that landowners attach to property”).
89. DOBBS, supra, note 40, at 615–20.
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332(2) cmt. a (1965).
91. Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

17

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 11

2011]

WHEN THE RESTATEMENT IS NOT A RESTATEMENT

1465

example, a duty of reasonable care could be owed if the trespasser
was a child, was confronting a danger known only to the owner, was
a frequent trespasser on a limited area, or when the trespasser was
92
helpless to protect himself from a danger.
As has been the case over the generations of the common law,
these reforms were the result of multiple forces. Society had
become increasingly complex and urbanized, making the
frequency of large, difficult-to-oversee tracts of property far less
common. At the same time there was the increased value of safety
(the recognition that we can all be plaintiffs at some point),
reflected, for example, in the demise of the “fellow servant rule”
and the concomitant rise of workers’ compensation. Similarly,
policy justifications reflected a mix of normative preferences (for
example, it seems unfair to allow the owners of public land,
supported by taxes, to avoid providing entrants a duty of
reasonable care) and utilitarian principles (the burden to take
reasonable precautions is less when the duty only attaches to a
small part of the premises or when the social welfare is maximized
when the owner can easily save a helpless trespasser from serious
injury).
A half-century ago, the myriad rules, based upon what seemed
to be almost meaninglessly thin distinctions, had become so
93
baroque that they seemed ripe for fundamental rethinking. The
vehicle for this change was a decision of the California Supreme
94
Court, Rowland v. Christian. Consistent with the reformist zeitgeist
of the times, Rowland attacked the three-tiered duty regime, and its
95
myriad exceptions, head-on. The facts were simple, and involved
a pocket of law that California had not reformed: when a social
guest encounters a latent danger known to the owner or
discoverable through the use of reasonable care. In such cases, at
that time, the law in many jurisdictions often imposed no duty to
96
warn. This crabbed doctrine violated instrumentalist goals (the
cost of providing a warning was minimal, and the benefit of
avoiding the risk of a sliced hand significant), as well as normative
92. Id. §§ 334–39.
93. DOBBS, supra note 40, at 615–16.
94. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968), superseded by statute, CAL. (PROPERTY) CODE § 847
(West 2007), as recognized in Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery, 968 P.2d 65, 71–72
(Cal. 1998).
95. See Cardi & Green, supra note 77, at 672 (discussing how the California
Supreme Court took a leading role in changing tort law in the 1980s and 1990s).
96. See, e.g., HARPER ET AL., supra note 85, at 223–25.
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goals (it is unfair to make a person on the premises with permission
face a latent danger known to the owner). Courts inclined to
reform could change the law incrementally by imposing a duty to
warn in such circumstances (but not any duty to inspect), thereby
changing only one aspect of the centuries-old, tiered regime.
The California Supreme Court, under the leadership of the
widely respected Chief Justice William Traynor, chose a bolder
approach.
Fundamental change was necessary because the
common law had become so riddled with exceptions that the tiered
system no longer provided reliable guidance; it was, in the court’s
97
language, a “semantic morass.”
This confusion is “due to the
attempts to apply just rules in our modern society within the
98
ancient terminology.”
Rather, the negligence system “often
do[es] not reflect the major factors which should determine
whether immunity should be conferred upon the possessor of
99
land.” The court further noted:
Some of those factors, including the closeness of the
connection between the injury and the defendant’s
conduct, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s
conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, and the
prevalence and availability of insurance, bear little, if any,
relationship to the classifications of trespasser, licensee
100
and invitee and the existing rules conferring immunity.
The court chose to apply “ordinary principles of negligence,”
holding that an owner of property owed all entrants a duty of
reasonable care, regardless of their purpose for being on the land
101
or whether the visit was with permission. By imposing a “unitary”
standard and a duty of reasonable care in all circumstances,
Rowland had the practical consequence of narrowing the range of
cases in which a trial judge could dispose of a premises liability
97. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 566 (“In an effort to do justice in an industrialized
urban society, with its complex economic and individual relationships, modern
common-law courts have found it necessary to formulate increasingly subtle verbal
refinements, to create subclassifications among traditional common-law
categories, and to delineate fine gradations in the standards of care which the
landowner owes to each. Yet even within a single jurisdiction, the classifications
and subclassifications bred by the common law have produced confusion and
conflict. As new distinctions have been spawned, older ones have become
obscured.”).
98. Id. at 567.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 568.
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claim before trial. But while doing away with the tiered approach,
the court provided a Delphic, and potentially significant,
qualification: while status was no longer “determinative” of whether
a duty of reasonable care was owed, it may “have some bearing on
102
the question of liability.”
Despite this last limit on the boldness and scope of the
decision, Rowland triggered much interest on the part of other
courts and scholars, with many predictions that the unitary
103
approach was destined to replace status-based rules. As it turned
out, there was no flood of fundamental reform to the status-based
regime over the next forty years: only a few jurisdictions followed
California and completely eliminated status as the basis for
differing duties, while a much larger group melded the invitee and
licensee category, recognizing a duty of reasonable care to
everyone on land with permission, but continuing to impose a far
104
more limited duty when the entrant was a trespasser.
The
remaining states, a strong minority, retained all three statuses but
continued the time-honored approach of making modest
adjustments to the common law, generally in the direction of
105
greater landowner liability.
It was the variegated collection of
approaches that faced the reporters of the Third Restatement
(Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009) as they set out to “restate” the law of
premises liability.
III. THE ALI LABORATORY CREATES THE “FLAGRANT TRESPASSER”
The reporters were faced with an interesting situation when
considering the law of premises liability. By their count, the states
were basically split down the middle, with about half retaining the
three-tiered/status approach; the rest either collapsed invitees and
licensees into a single category and imposed the garden-variety
duty of reasonable care (but continued to recognize a
circumscribed duty to trespassers), or followed California and

102. Id.
103. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from
the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 512 n.163 (1976) (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 513–14.
105. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 51 cmt. a reporters’ note & table (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009); see also
Ann Fievet, Comment, Breaking the Law and Getting Paid for It: How the Third
Restatement of Torts Synthesizes Two Distinct Standards of Care Owed to Trespassers, 44
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239 (2009) (summarizing the common law).
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106

adopted a unitary approach.
As an initial matter, the ALI decided to meld the categories of
invitees and licensees, so that both classes of entrants on land were
107
owed a duty of reasonable care.
This move was eminently
sensible—after all, both groups are on the premises with the
owner’s permission and thus impose no “taking” or infringement
on the right of quiet use and enjoyment nor upon the related right
108
to exclude unwanted visitors from the premises. It is also the case
that there is often no greater burden imposed on the property
owner for social, as opposed to business, guests.
And, as
mentioned previously, this position is consistent with the law in
109
about half of the states since the Second Restatement.
The new provisions also went a step further, tacking in the
direction of a minority of states led by California in Rowland that
110
extend the duty of reasonable care even to trespassers.
In so
doing, the ALI adopted a unitary standard, but added an important
and quite new concept, reflecting the broad array of motives that
may explain a trespasser’s presence on the premises—the duty of
reasonable care did not extend to “flagrant trespassers.” Such
miscreants were owed only the traditional minimal duty of care
owed to persons on the land without permission, i.e., the duty to
111
merely refrain from inflicting “willful and wanton injury.”
The
motivation of the reporters was clear: the “trespasser” category
contains actors who enter the premises with a broad range of
motivations and who engaged in a variety of conduct—some as
106. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 51 cmt. a reporters’ note & table (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009).
107. See id. at cmt. a.
108. See id. at cmt. c (listing justifications for moving toward a unitary
standard).
109. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 cmts. b, c (1965).
110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 51 cmt. a reporters’ note & table (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009) (listing
states that extend a full duty of reasonable care to trespassers: Alaska, California,
Colorado, Hawaii, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York).
111. Id. § 52(a).
Additionally, section 51, comment j describes the
circumstances in which even states adopting a unitary standard are reluctant to
extend the duty of reasonable care to all trespassers, i.e., to trespassers who enter
the property to commit a crime or act in some other way repugnant to the
possessor’s right of exclusive control. Section 52, comment a, defined the
category undeserving of a duty of reasonable care as when the trespass is
“egregious or atrocious,” or “sufficiently offensive to the property rights of the
land possessor it is unfair to subject the possessor to liability for mere negligence.”
An earlier draft used the terminology “culpable” trespassers. See infra note 115
and accompanying text.
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benign as the child who cuts across another’s yard on the way to
school, some as malign as a burglar imbued with felonious intent.
The response of the Second Restatement to this array of
circumstances was to carve out a few context-specific exceptions
112
(the child trespasser doctrine being the best-known). The focus
in the Third Restatement (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009) became
whether the infringement of the owner’s property was “highly
113
culpable or entitlement destructive.”
The reporters tried to capture the distinction by identifying in
the comments to section 52 those trespassers whose presence on
the property was “egregious or atrocious” (or elsewhere
“particularly egregious”) and thus “so antithetical to the rights of
the land possessor to exclusive use and possession” that it is
“unfair” to impose anything more than the most minimal duty of
114
care. The reporters then made a most unusual move, eschewing
the step that most lawyers follow instinctively when a term of art is
employed, that is, providing a definition. Instead, the reporters
“[left] each jurisdiction employing the concept to determine the
point along the spectrum of trespassory conduct at which a
115
trespasser is a ‘flagrant’ rather than an ordinary trespasser.”
In an effort to provide at least some guidance, the reporters
identified two examples that “are sufficiently extreme as to be
applicable regardless of where a jurisdiction chooses to draw the
116
[flagrant/ordinary] line.”
The first case involves a person
walking in a city park after the posted hours it was open to the
public, an act that was trespassory but not highly inconsistent with
the rights of the city, while the second—the flagrant trespasser—
involves a burglar who is injured while trying to flee the

112. See supra note 111.
113. Ellen M. Bublick, A Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Intentional Harm
to Persons—Thoughts, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1335, 1346 (2009).
114. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
52 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009) (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009); see also id. at
cmt. b (noting that the presence of flagrant trespassers is “so inconsistent with and
offensive to the rights of the land possessor”).
115. Id. at cmt. a. It is interesting to note that the reporters say “no single
word can capture the concept,” but then provide what amounts to a single
appellation: “flagrant.” Id.; see also James A. Henderson, Jr., The Status of Trespassers
on Land, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1071, 1077, n.35 (2009) (criticizing the use of the
term “flagrant” and noting that a previous draft used, and actually defined, the
term “culpable”).
116. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
52 cmt. a reporters’ note (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009).
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117

defendant’s premises.
Other illustrations are offered to show
“factors that might be relevant to a determination whether a
trespass was flagrant,” including a pair of examples in which the
injured person was engaged in highly culpable behavior but in one
instance did not also implicate the right of the possessor “to use
118
that property as the possessor sees fit,” and another pair which
119
are distinguished by repeated warnings and damage to property.
The reporters then set out to justify why they took the highly
unusual step of recognizing a new legal concept but not defining it.
First, different jurisdictions might set the balance between safety
concerns and the rights of property owners differently, giving more
(or less) weight to the balance between communitarian and
120
libertarian values.
Second, some jurisdictions might prefer
“bright-line rules” to a more flexible standard that allows for case121
by-case development.
Third, and closely related to the second
point, the reporters pay homage to the “common law process
[that] depends on accumulated learning from individual cases” to
122
help gradually define a concept that is “new to the Restatement.”
The Reporters’ Note identifies support for their choice,
though none of it terribly convincing: extrapolation from a handful
of criminal statutes, drawing negative inferences from a group of
about ten state court decisions, and dicta from a single decision of

117. Id. at cmt. a, illus. 1, 2.
118. Id. at cmt. a. The reporters distinguish an injury occurring on property in
conjunction with a crime on the property (flagrant trespass) and an injury that
occurs after a crime was committed off the premises but where the injury occurs
on the premises (ordinary trespass). Id. at cmt. a, illus. 3, 4.
119. See id. at cmt. a, illus. 5, 6. In illustration five, the landowner “erected
large signs warning trespassers to keep off and employed a private security firm to
patrol the area.” Id. at cmt. a, illus. 5. In illustration 6, the trespassers repeatedly
returned to the landowner’s property to destroy it despite verbal warnings. Id. at
cmt. a, illus. 6.
120. See id. at cmt. a (“[D]ifferent jurisdictions . . . will have different values
about the relative importance of protecting the safety of entrants on land and
protecting the rights of land possessors . . . .”).
121. Id. On the other hand, “[o]thers may prefer to adopt more general
standards that allow the factfinder to take into account all of the facts and
circumstances of the case.” Id.
122. Id. This, as will be seen, is an understatement: the concept is new not just
to the Third Restatement but to the law more broadly. See, e.g., Bublick, supra note
113, at 1346 (“Introducing the new category ‘flagrant trespasser’ into the law was a
subject of concern precisely because the category created a division where none
had previously been, requiring new common-law development of the concept by
judges.”).
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123

the Alabama Supreme Court.
The first authority cited is the legislative push-back from the
unitary standard of care recognized in Rowland v. Christian in the
form of a California statute that stripped a person injured on the
land from a claim based upon mere negligence if they were in the
process of committing one of a list of twenty-five felonies, and
124
similar legislation in five other states and British Columbia.
Next, the reporters point to the post-Rowland decisions that
refused to adopt a unitary standard that encompassed trespassers
because “a criminal intruder who is injured should not be able to
125
sue the negligent land possessor.” They summarized these cases,
observing that “no source has been found expressing any dissent to
the proposition that land possessors should not be liable for
126
negligently injuring a criminal trespasser.”
Their most direct case authority is a decision of the Alabama
Supreme Court, which distinguishes “‘mere’ trespassers” from
trespassers who are on the premises with the intent to commit a
127
128
crime.
According to the reporters, Ryals v. U.S. Steel Corp.
129
A closer
“employs different duties for each class of trespasser.”
look at the opinion, however, weakens the precedential value, as
the case turned on whether the plaintiff adduced sufficient
evidence of wanton misconduct, with the recognition of two classes
130
of trespassers appearing in dicta.
These and the other cited sources do support the view that all
131
trespassers should not be treated the same, as the common law

123. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 52 cmt. a reporters’ note (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009).
124. Id. The five additional states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Louisiana,
and Washington.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 562 So. 2d 192 (Ala. 1990).
129. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
52 cmt. a reporters’ note (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009).
130. Ryals, 562 So. 2d at 193–95 (issue presented was whether plaintiff
adduced sufficient of wrongdoing to withstand summary judgment).
131. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 52 cmt. a reporters’ note (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009); see also, e.g., Ryals,
562 So.2d at 193 (noting that “trespassers who enter upon the land of another
with the manifest intent to commit a criminal act” are trespassers “to whom the
landowner owes only the duty not to intentionally injure them” while “mere
trespassers” are trespassers “to whom the landowner owes the duty not to wantonly
injure them”).
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has done for years by recognizing exceptions for children, known
132
trespassers, and so forth, and given the intuition (or in their
language “widespread sentiment”) that someone who enters
another’s land without permission intending to commit a serious
wrong is undeserving of a duty of reasonable care from the putative
133
victim.
And the statutory provisions referred to, along with the
scattered language in the cited opinions, do support a minority
134
view that criminals are undeserving of a duty of due care. What is
lacking is any support for creating an entirely new category: the
“flagrant trespasser.”
This, the reporters recognize, albeit
delicately: “The synthesis of land-possessor duties provided in this
Chapter and Section employs different terminology than that used
in the Second Restatement or in the reforms to that law that have
135
emerged since.”

132. E.g., Robert S. Driscoll, Note, The Law of Premises Liability in America: Its
Past, Present, and Some Considerations for its Future, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 881, 885
(2006) (discussing common-law liability for trespassers and noting that exceptions
exist where “the landowner knows or has reason to know that members of the
public constantly trespass, knows or has reason to know of a specific trespasser on
the land, or with trespassers who are children.”).
133. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB, FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 52 cmt. a reporters’ note (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009); see also, e.g.,
Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 165, 199 N.W.2d 639, 642 (1972) (“Burglars are
trespassers; vandals are trespassers.
We have criminal statutes governing
trespassers. Sweeping away all distinction between trespassers and social guests
and business invitees is a drastic step to take because there may be, and often is,
good reason to distinguish between a trespasser and a social guest.” (internal
citation omitted)).
134. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 52 cmt. a reporters’ note (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009) (noting that “[a]
handful of states have statutes that limit the ability of plaintiffs to recover for
injuries suffered in the course of committing (or fleeing the commission of)
certain crimes.”); see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-119 (2005) (“No person . .
. shall have a right to recover damages sustained during the commission of or
during immediate flight from an act that is defined by any law of this state or the
United States to be a felony, if the conditions stipulated in this section apply.”);
Ryals, 562 So. 2d at 193 (noting that “trespassers who enter upon the land of
another with the manifest intent to commit a criminal act” are trespassers “to
whom the landowner owes only the duty not to intentionally injure them”).
135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 52 cmt. a reporters’ note (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009). The new rules include
an exception that protects even some “flagrant trespassers” because they are
“unforeseeable or more difficult to protect.” Id. at § 52(b).
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IV. THE THIRD RESTATEMENT AND THE ROAD NEVER BEFORE TAKEN
As was the case when the ALI adopted the principle of strict
liability in tort for product-related injuries, the ALI set sail in
uncharted waters when it recognized a new premises liability
category, the “flagrant trespasser.” As the reporters admit, “[i]n all
candor, the place where we have carved at the joint of this conflict
between tort and property concerns does not reflect anything that
136
might be described as a majority or even plurality rule.”
There
are a number of criticisms that can be leveled at the ALI for
adopting this approach. First, the rules covering injuries to such
miscreants are internally inconsistent. Second, the term used to
describe the category of undeserving plaintiffs is inartful. Third, it
is unwise to announce but refuse to define it. Fourth, the creation
of a new legal concept represents an illegitimate exercise of power.
A. The Inconsistency Critique
Section 52 is flawed because it reflects inconsistent rationales:
nodding toward normative concerns, it rejects an obligation of due
care for really bad (“flagrant”) trespassers, while at the same time
nodding toward instrumental/efficiency concerns by recognizing
exceptions that impose due care when a flagrant trespasser is
helpless and unable to protect himself—recognizing that, in such a
setting, the landowner is in the best position to ameliorate
137
danger.
138
This critique, propounded by James Henderson, is weak. It
is unsurprising that a restatement provision fails the test of
intellectual consistency: the common law of torts reflects a blend of
policies, primarily corrective justice and instrumentalism and
wealth-maximization, and just as we should expect the output from
the legislative process to reflect compromise and trade-off, we
should be tolerant of such “impure” doctrines in the common
139
law. As Ellen Bublick observed:
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at Reporters’ Memorandum.
Henderson, supra note 115, at 1076–77.
Id.
Jane Stapleton, Controlling the Future of the Common Law by Restatement, in
EXPLORING TORT LAW 262, 266–67 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005). Another
critique of the new premises liability provisions focuses on the “packaging,” that is
that premises principles should not have been covered in a separate chapter at all,
but rather were better located in the general discussion of duty in section 7. See
Stephen D. Sugarman, Land-Possessor Liability in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Too
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Of course, a Restatement cannot create a grand scheme
that unites all disparate tort doctrines into a single
uniform framework.
Nor can the drafting process
unearth an essential taxonomy of the subject. Yet when
designing a system of liability, a Restatement need not be
sanguine about adopting a patchwork of liability rules that
140
cannot be reconciled on any principled basis.
B. The Terminology Critique
The narrowest concern raised by how the Third Restatement
handles injuries to trespassers is the choice of the word “flagrant”
to describe the category of injured entrants who are undeserving of
a duty of due care. The reporters state that the term “flagrant” is
used “in the sense of egregious or atrocious rather than its
141
alternative meaning of conspicuous.”
This was a change from
142
earlier drafts, which used the term “culpable.”
Professor Henderson takes issue with the terminology,
preferring either the initial term used (“culpable”), or replacing it
143
with a word such as “undeserving,” or “reprehensible”.
To
Henderson, the ALI’s final formulation fails to capture the lack of
moral standing of a particular trespasser (rather than merely the
wrongfulness associated by an “entry without permission, as
144
such”).
The reporters acknowledge the problem by trying to take one
possible meaning of flagrant off of the table: the sense that it could
mean “conspicuous” (for example, a noisy entrance intended to
145
call attention to the intrusion on to defendant’s property). And
they admit that “no single word can capture the concept,” although
Much and Too Little, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1079 (2009).
140. Bublick, supra note 113, at 1335–36 (2009); see also GILMORE, supra note 5,
at 108–09 (“[T]he components of the formalistic approach have included the
search for the theoretical formulas assumed to be of universal validity and the
insistence that all particular instances should be analyzed and dealt with in the
light of the overall theoretical structure. . . . [W]e will do well to be on our guard
against all-purpose theoretical solutions to our problems.”).
141. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM, §
52 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009).
142. Id. § 52(a).
143. Henderson, supra note 115, at 1077. Other meanings that are implicitly
excluded include “blatant,” “glaring,” and “obvious.” MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2011).
144. Henderson, supra note 115, at 1077.
145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM, §
52 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 6 2009).
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that, of course, is not responsive to whether “flagrant” comes
closest to capturing both the factual settings and the policies
146
implicated. The reporters also try to make clear the focus is not
solely upon the intent of the entrant, as when a bank robber’s
147
escape leads to a private yard where an injury occurs. In such a
circumstance the felon would not, despite being a bad person, be
considered a “flagrant” trespasser because the entrance did not
strip the owner of her “rights to personal security,” as compared to
a thief injured on the premises in the process of an effort to
148
burglarize the premises.
Such outcomes are, admittedly, “counter to some intuitions”
but reflect the singular focus on the extent to which the wrong is
“antithetical to the rights of the land possessor to exclusive
149
possession and use of the land.”
While Professor Henderson’s
critique has merit, his preferred locutions add little that is not
available to a person trying to capture the gist of the section from a
close reading of the black-letter law and comments.
C. The Lawmaking Critique
The reporters are candid. They recognize that they have
created a legal category where one never existed before: “The
synthesis of land-possessor duties provided in this Chapter and
Section employs different terminology than that used in the
Second Restatement or in the reforms to that law that have
150
emerged since.”
The ALI has in the past only occasionally
undertaken to identify an important new principle, justified not by
a synthesis of court decisions but rather on a belief that existing law
was flawed, with the best example in the torts context the
recognition of “strict liability in tort” in section 402A of the Second
151
Restatement.
Reluctance to remake the law makes sense on a number of
grounds. First, it is consistent with the common law method, which
relies upon many judges deciding many cases involving many
variations in the facts over time. The intrinsic conservatism of the
common law approach was reflected in the observation of Arthur
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 40–58 and accompanying text.
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Corbin, who urged the ALI of the 1930s to proceed cautiously in its
law reform efforts: “[T]he best way to turn mores into law is to do it
152
piecemeal by the ‘molecular motion’ of the courts.” This general
preference for incrementalism over bold strokes was well described
by Cass Sunstein:
“Anglo-American courts often take small rather than large
steps, bracketing the hardest and most divisive issues.
....
. . . It is alert to the existence of reasonable disagreement
in a heterogeneous society. It knows that there is much
that it does not know; it is intensely aware of its own
limitations. . . . It avoids clear rules and final resolutions.
Alert to the problem of unanticipated consequences, it
sees itself as part of a system of democratic deliberation; it
attempts to promote the democratic ideals of
participation, deliberation, and responsiveness. It allows
153
continued space for democratic reflection . . . .”
Guido Calabresi described how the “slow, unsystematic, and
organic quality of common law” meant that “no single judge could
ultimately change the law, and a series of judges could only do so
over time and in response to changed events or to changed
154
attitudes in the people.”
One can extract from such classic discussions of the common
law method the following characteristics:
 Modesty. Judges working in the common law system must be
aware of the inability of humans to solve complex problems.
They should proceed with humility and a recognition of the risk
of causing unintended consequences through the exercise of
judicial power. Even the wisest judge should display a Burkean
155
reluctance to attack—let alone try to solve—grand problems.
As Benjamin Cardozo observed, “The common law does not
work from pre-established truths of universal and inflexible
152. Arthur L. Corbin, The Restatement of the Common Law by the American Law
Institute, 15 IOWA L. REV. 19, 28 (1930).
153. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT ix–x (1999).
154. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUES 4, 5 (1982).
155. David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 845, 857–60 (2007) (“It is unwise to try to resolve a problem without
deferring to some degree to the collected wisdom reflected in what others have
done when faced with a similar problem in the past.”); see also GRANT GILMORE,
THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 99–100 (1977) (“Man’s fate will forever elude the
attempts of his intellect to understand it.”).
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validity to conclusions derived from them deductively. Its
156
method is inductive . . . .”
 A preference for precedent. Common law judges do not
generally work on a blank canvas, and this is not just due to a
generalized preference for relying upon judicial precedents.
Rather, it reflects a healthy respect for a “rough empiricism” and
an inclination toward concrete solutions to specific problems,
rather than the tackling of what are invariably complex issues via
157
abstract notions of how the world should be.
The result is
doctrine “forged from . . . the hammer and anvil of litigation”
and a system built by the “gradual accretion of special
158
instances,” i.e., a system characterized by “[e]volution, not
159
revolution [and] slow and unconscious adaptation . . . .”
 Dialogue. Common law judges can be seen as pursuing a
version of the scientific method. They welcome the opportunity
to test possible outcomes and reasoning by considering the
160
decisions of other judges facing similar problems. In turn, the
common law judge’s decision becomes a data point for the next
judge who faces an identical, or even related, fact situation, who
then asks whether the earlier decision appears to have been a
wise resolution. In this sense, the common law judge launches a
“trial balloon,” whose virtue is then measured by the judges that
161
later come to face a similar question.
As a venerable
156. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 22–23
(1921).
157. Strauss, supra note 155, at 858; see also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE
GROWTH OF THE LAW 55 (1924) (“[The common law] process of trial and error
determines [judgments’] right to reproduce their kind.”); O. W. HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW xix (Mark D. Howe ed., Harv. Univ. Press 1963) (1881) (“[T]he
common law is . . . a lesson in the tentative and experimental character of
judgment.”).
158. Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6,
7 (1937). For a considerably less sanguine view of the value of precedent, see
FRANK ZAPPA WITH PETER OCCHIOGROSSO, THE REAL FRANK ZAPPA BOOK 327–28
(1989) (“Case law is what happens when a stupid judicial decision from one place
gets cited as a ‘legal precedent,’ forming the basis for another stupid judicial
decision somewhere else—like a computer virus.”) (emphasis in original).
159. Bruce Ackerman, The Common Law Constitution of John Marshall Harlan, 36
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 5, 6 (1991) (noting also the cultural impact of intellectual
Darwinism).
160. MUNROE SMITH, JURISPRUDENCE 21 (1908).
161. See Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental
Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575,
1837 n.1043 (2001) (citing and quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 176 (1962)); see
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proponent of the common law method put it, common law rules
162
are laid “down provisionally only.”
It is interesting to consider how the Third Restatement fares
on these counts. The most obvious question is the wisdom of
announcing a legal category where none existed before.
Introducing the “flagrant trespasser” will require judges to
163
consider, and construct, a new legal principle.
But “[t]he need
for the division stemmed from issues of principle or policy—the
need for a no-duty rule in some trespasser cases but not others—
not from a need to update a Restatement project to match new
164
doctrines that had been developed by common-law courts.”
However, the reporters did pursue a “rough empiricism” (what
165
they call a “synthesis”), albeit not by counting cases (the typical
approach) but instead by teasing out of the judicial decisions that
have rejected a unitary regime a perceived need to protect
premises owners from entrants with a purpose fundamentally at
166
odds with the rights of the owner.
In addition, and consistent
with past practice, the reporters could point to the legislative
reactions post-Rowland that have rejected extending a duty of due
167
care to this sort of trespasser.
And how about dialogue? In a most unusual move, the
reporters eschewed defining the “flagrant trespasser” category,
while providing six examples of where the line might be drawn
between flagrant and non-flagrant trespassers. This is a highly
unusual maneuver, at least in the Third Restatement. In only one
other place in the project did the reporters reflect uncertainty
regarding the adopted position. In the discussion of “factual
cause” (section 26), the reporters added a comment “n” that

also David R. Barnhizer, Prophets, Priests, and Power Blockers: Three Fundamental Roles
of Judges and Legal Scholars in America, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 127, 141–42 (1988)
(arguing that the “real role of the Common Law judge” involves the ability to
“release . . . hypothetical ‘trial balloons’”).
162. JAMES C. CARTER, THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON LAW 25
(1884) microformed on Nineteenth-Century Legal Treatises No. 1183 (Research
Publications).
163. Bublick, supra note 113, at 1346.
164. Id.
165. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
52 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009).
166. Id.
167. See Greenwald, supra note 39, at 301 (“The second series of Restatements .
. . [has] come increasingly to draw upon statutes as sources of future common-law
developments.”).
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discusses “lost opportunity or lost chance as harm.”
After
describing the circumstances in which the doctrine has been
recognized (characterized as “halting”) the reporters declined to
168
endorse the concept.
Interestingly, the Second Restatement made far greater use
of a similar deferential device, the “caveat.”
Caveats were
appropriate because “the function of the reporter was to state the
law as it is rather than to speculate as to what the law should be in
169
cases where there is substantially no authority.”
There were numerous caveats in previous restatements of torts.
For example, in the discussion of strict liability for “ultrahazardous
activities,” section 520 added: “Caveat: The Institute expresses no
opinion as to whether the construction and use of a large tank or
artificial reservoir in which a large body of water or other fluid is
170
collected is or is not an ultrahazardous activity.”
More broadly,
the first section of the Second Restatement announced that
subsequent sections will contain many caveats reflecting the
171
generative nature of tort law.
The failure of the Third Restatement to define “flagrant
trespasser” can then be seen as consistent with examples from past
restatements as well as the “dialogic” ideal of the common law. The
tactic allows for, indeed invites, the full and rounded consideration

168. The reporters identified two reasons for this position: the fact that the
doctrine “reconceptualizes the harm” means that the concept is not simply a
matter of factual causation, and because courts have so far confined the concept
to medical malpractice contexts, it was part of “a specialized area of negligence
liability outside the scope of this Restatement.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 cmt. n (2005).
169. See Patrick J. Kelley, The First Restatement of Torts: Reform by Descriptive
Theory, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 93, 105 (2007) (quoting Francis H. Bohlen, reporter for
the Restatement (First) of Torts (1934)).
170. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. c (1938). This limitation seems
surprising given that the seminal case applying strict liability for harmful uses of
land, Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] UKHL 1, (1868) LR 3 HL 330, has been discussed
in many American cases and was well known and the subject of significant
commentary, including an extended discussion in the reporter’s treatise. See
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 77 (3d ed. 1964).
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e (1965) (“Because of the
probability that the tendency to give legal protection to interests now unprotected
and to increase the protection given to those now imperfectly protected will
continue, the Restatement of this Subject contains numerous ‘Caveats.’ These call
attention to the fact that the Institute takes no position as to whether the
protection given to a particular interest by the rule stated in the Section to which
the Caveat applies should or should not be extended to other analogous situations
which have not been the subject of judicial consideration.”).
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of the issues raised (like whether a state would prefer a bright-line
rule that applies to all felons injured on the premises), while
providing examples that can be used to guide, if not direct, the
analysis by courts.
The “flagrant trespasser” is not a “bright-line concept but one
that is left to develop in future cases. But it does have the
advantage of a reasoned, progressive approach that avoids the
confusing array of classes of trespassers that are sprinkled
172
throughout decisions,” while at the same time recognizing the
appealing notion that not all trespassers are alike. And, the very
restatement process itself, with all of its layers of review, involving
hundreds of specialists in the field, provides some assurance that
173
the position adopted will not be wildly off the mark.
In summary, the Third Restatement reporters can cleave
themselves to the words of one of the greatest twentieth-century
thinkers (and one-time ALI director) Herbert Wechsler: “The
crucial point has always seemed to me to be that a decision when it
breaks new ground . . . initiates a dialogue by its supporting
reasons, reasons whose persuasiveness to others will largely be the
174
measure of its ultimate success.”
D. The Legitimacy Critique
By any measure, the ALI and its restatements play an
important role in debates about legal rules, especially in torts.
Regularly cited by courts, and undoubtedly relied upon by
172. Michael D. Green & Larry S. Stewart, The New Restatement’s Top 10 Torts
Tools, TRIAL, Apr. 2010, at 47.
173. See Doug Rendelman, Restating Restitution: The Restatement and Its Critics, 65
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 933, 943 (2008) (“The restatement process does not
specifically follow a common law court’s adversary technique, with the reporter
acting as judge, receiving adversaries’ briefs, and drafting an opinion for a
collegial court. But the ALI’s formal process resembles the best features of a
common law decision-making process: ‘[t]he combination of explicitly normative
reasoning with a reliance on the lessons of the past, along with a recognition that
both are indispensable.’ . . . Related areas are examined. Majority and minority
rules are consulted. The reporter’s research, ideas, and articulation are tested
against others’. The reporter’s drafts are exposed to the curiosity and candor of
the members’ consultive group, the advisers, the council, and the members. Each
phase is a potential intellectual crucible, although the testing may occur off the
public stage. Although its membership could be more diverse, the ALI internal
process is rigorous and intellectually heterogeneous within the intellectual
community of doctrinal legal analysis.”).
174. Herbert Wechsler, Address at the Annual Dinner of the American Law Institute
(May 17, 1984), 61 A.L.I. PROC. 408, 411 (1985) (on file with author).
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practitioners even more often, restatements help shape the law in
175
This great influence is in
an increasingly broad array of fields.
large measure due to the level of talent arrayed for projects,
especially the reporters and, to a lesser extent, the advisers, who
have deep and broad involvement in the subject areas covered.
These drafters, though as a group highly regarded in their
particular areas of expertise, are then necessarily unrepresentative
176
of the legal profession, let alone the citizenry generally.
The selection process for key roles within the ALI is even less
democratic: the council is selected from the membership (typically
about 3,000 academic and practicing lawyers and judges, but with
little actual competition for leadership positions, as is the case with
177
the governance of many non-profits).
The council has the sole
178
The director, then, has broad
power to appoint the director.
authority to both identify the topics appropriate for “restating” as
well as to appoint the reporters and advisers, although the practice
is for the director to consult members of the council before making
179
these important decisions.
And while reporters typically bring
knowledge and expertise to deliberations, their degree of influence
is uneven. As one reporter wrote, “The text of a restatement . . . is
largely the product of the reporter. The reporter must answer, of
course, to a group of advisers, but their oversight is incomplete”
180
due to “[l]imitations of time and expertise.”
Once the advisers sign off, the reporters seek approval from
the council (a group of approximately fifty-five), but the level of
understanding and preparation in this group may not be the match
181
for a strong-willed reporter.
The final step is approval by the
entire membership, but in practice many issues are resolved by a
relatively small group who prepare for the annual meeting (by
reading the voluminous materials beforehand) and who are willing,
175. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. The ALI has also been
influential in non-restatement projects, such as the Model Penal Code. AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, PAST AND PRESENT ALI PROJECTS 4 (2010), available at
http://www.ali.org/doc/past_present_ALIprojects.pdf.
176. See Adams, supra note 24, at 239; Posner, supra note 62, at 323.
177. AM. LAW INST., RULES OF THE COUNCIL, 1–4 (2007), available at
http://www.ali.org/doc/rules_council.pdf.
178. Id. at 8.
179. E-mail from Lance Liebman, ALI Director, to author (Oct. 26, 2010) (on
file with author).
180. Charles W. Wolfram, Bismarck’s Sausages and the ALI’s Restatements, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 830 (1998).
181. Id. at 831–32.
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182

despite their busy schedules, to sit through hours of debate.
Indeed, on occasion, a provision is considered and passed by fewer
183
than one hundred members.
Such a closed loop of a system would be unacceptable if the
end result of ALI projects were binding on courts, which, of course,
they are not. Nevertheless, this is an area of concern because of
184
this combination of high influence and low representation. This
critique is especially persuasive in the context of the exercise of
judicial power, because federal judges, and many state judges,
constitute the least democratic branch of government, largely
immune from the discipline provided by the need to regularly
stand for general election (often termed “the countermajoritan
185
difficulty”).
And, just as no ALI pronouncement binds any judge (let
alone legislator), the legislature and executive branches have the
power (within constitutional limits) to overrule a court’s decision
to adopt a restatement rule. However, “Restatements can have the
same dire consequence [as a statute]—relied upon by a tribunal for
a proposition that burdens a litigant in a proceeding no matter
how strenuous the litigant’s argument that the restatement
186
provision in question has it wrong.”
Although ALI positions are not the result of anything close
187
to a democratic process, the institute’s handiwork is intended to,
and often does, impact society. And having a meritocratic rather
than democratic process yields not only decision makers who are
knowledgeable, but also the virtue of members less likely to be
swayed by the passions of the street. Ultimately, the level of
influence accorded a restatement rule is determined in the rough
and tumble of litigation in coming years. In this sense, the ALI’s
work, though antidemocratic in origin, will be tested and will stand
or fall in the marketplace of ideas.

182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 832.
Id.
See id.; see Elson, supra note 68.
See JAMES W. CAESAR, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, ORIGINS, INSTITUTIONS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 410 (2002).
186. Wolfram, supra note 180, at 817. Professor Wolfram notes the “strange
exceptions . . . [involving] the United States Northern Mariana and Virgin Islands
where local statutes make a Restatement position binding . . . in the absence of
contrary local authority.” Id. at 819 n.8.
187. Id. at 829 (“[T]he ALI process of generating a Restatement is hardly artful
or even inartfully democratic.”).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Third Restatement made welcome changes to premises
liability law, especially the merging of invitee and licensee
categories, a move that reflects modern, rather than feudal
concepts about the relative value of safety versus the prerogatives of
landowners. The proposals will also hopefully bring order where
there is now a morass of rules and exceptions and exceptions to
exceptions, not just differing among jurisdictions, but even within a
single jurisdiction. There is also much positive about heightened
concern with safety in the many contexts when trespassers are
injured on the premises. And, as a measure of progress, the
restatement treatment of trespassers has been reduced from seven
to two sections, a positive step in the direction of a core ALI goal of
simplifying the law.
What is not so clear is whether the new category of flagrant
trespasser is the right approach. As a creature of normative policy,
it reflects the common sense notion that wrongdoers are generally
disfavored in the law: the equitable doctrine of “unclean hands” or
the common law rule that a plaintiff’s gross negligence precludes
recovery from a defendant whose conduct was merely negligent are
but two examples. It also has support in scattered positive law, like
the state statutes that preclude liability when a trespasser is injured
188
while committing a felony.
The rub is the absence of judicial
decisions, with the ALI proceeding in largely uncharted territory,
not restating the law but rather making it up. This is inconsistent
with the most recently articulated ALI position: “[The restatement
aims] at clear formulations of common law and its statutory
elements or variations and reflect the law as it presently stands or
might plausibly be stated by a court. Restatement black-letter
189
formulations assume the stance of describing the law as it is.”
The handling of flagrant trespassers thus lays bare the core
tension that exists in the very DNA of the elite and undemocratic
ALI: whether it should be a force for bold law reform or a merely a
tidier of messy common law doctrine, whether it should stake out
190
“what law should be” rather than merely stating “what the law is.”
188. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 52 reporters’ note (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009).
189. Projects, Overview, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, http://ali.org/index.cfm
?fuseaction=projects.main (last visited Mar. 17, 2011).
190. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 743–44
(William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); see also Roberta Cooper
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The decision to create the flagrant trespasser category was made
without grounding in the product of many judges working on a
problem on a case-by-case basis, the core strength of the common
law process. The bold move is ameliorated somewhat by the
“punt,” reflected in the comments, in which the ALI expressly
eschews providing a core definition for the “flagrant trespasser”
concept, expressly leaving that task to judges in future cases.
Whether this compromise was wise will face the drafters of the
Fourth Restatement.

Ramo, The President’s Letter: On Compromise and Civility: American and American Law
Institute Values, 32 A.L.I. REP. 3 (2010) (“Reaching an ALI-authorized position that
achieves a fair view of the current state of law or an equally fair position of what
the law should be requires good representation from all points of view, a respect
for the majority view in the law across the country, and significant agreement on
the part of advisers, Members Consultative Groups, the Council, and ultimately
the entire membership.”), available at http://www.ali.org/_news/reporter
/spring2010/2_Presidents_Letter.htm.
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